Greetings, everyone! I hope that you are all having a great start to the new year. Over the past several weeks, foreign policy observers have published their annual forecasts on geopolitical dynamics that they think will chart the course of global affairs this year. So far, many of them believe that 2024 will be inundated with challenges due to political animosity, economic challenges, weather disruptions, and technologies reaching new heights. Many of these topics were addressed during the annual Munich Security Conference this past weekend, but they will manifest themselves in ways that may test our assumptions - and even conventional wisdom. With that in mind, I thought that it would be prudent to identify a few watchpoints that will hopefully enhance our understanding of what may await us in this very consequential region this year.
Slow Motion Progress in the U.S. - China relationship.
As we witnessed in last year’s exchanges between senior U.S. and Chinese officials, niceties will continue to be observed, and dialogues will not come to a complete standstill. So far, Washington and Beijing resumed the U.S.- PRC Defense Policy Coordination, and Secretary of State Blinken convened a dialogue with Liu Jiancho, the CCP’s International Liaison Department, who some have speculated is being considered to become China’s next Foreign Minister, just days before the Taiwanese populace chose incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s next leader on January 13th. Meanwhile, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, and both officials pledged to sustain bilateral lines of communication, one of which will include scheduling a phone call between President Biden and Xi Jinping later this spring. Finally, Blinken just had a “candid and constructive discussion” with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.
On the surface, both governments are giving the impression that managing tensions is a priority. That said, there is no singular antidote to bring the U.S. and China to better terms, and the new year won’t change the fact that this bilateral relationship is undergirded by strategic, geoeconomic, political, and ideological divergences. As 2024 progresses, both capitals will continue to double down on economic security in order to safeguard their cutting-edge technologies. For the U.S, this will be done by tightening export controls and foreign investment regulations; integrating supply chains with allies and partners; and strengthening its industrial policy endeavors.
The escalating nature of tensions in the Taiwan Strait will continue to be a central determinant in shaping the trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship. Neither side’s talking points as it regards Taiwan’s political status will deviate from long-standing policies. But as Secretary Blinken pointed out while at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, 50 percent of global trade flows through the waters that surround Taiwan. What this means is that Taiwan’s strategic well-being is not only a core U.S. interest - it is a matter of international concern. And now that we know that Lai Ching-te will succeed President Tsai Ing-wen in May, China will surely ramp up military activities around Taiwan, and by extension the East and South China Seas.
And finally, enter the U.S. presidential elections this November. We’ll have to wait until close to the end of the year to see who will be sitting in the Resolute desk starting on January 20, 2025. To state the obvious, should Biden get re-elected, there will be continuity in how his administration approaches foreign policy issues relating to China and the Indo-Pacific more broadly. On the other hand, some are already bracing for Trump to win the election. Should that happen, considering his track record, it would not be surprising if he resorts back to utilizing his old tactics vis-a-vis China such as imposing protectionist economic measures. During his recent interview with FoxNews, Trump is entertaining the idea of imposing a 60 percent tariff on all imports from China, or in his words, “maybe it’s going to be more than that.” In short, both Trump and Biden will have ample opportunities to illustrate how each of them intend to harden their stance on China should they get re-elected.
Hindrances will test efforts to quietly mature the à la carte minilateral ecosystem.
We live in an era where minilateralism is slowly but surely driving expectations on how to bolster institution-building in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. is presently serving as a lodestar and a motivating force behind fostering minilateralism. The U.S. and like-minded countries are no longer ambivalent about their preference to mature these groupings in order to expand cooperation on issues like maritime security; public health; infrastructure; foundational and frontier technologies; climate change and people-to-people ties. In theory, in addition to fostering principles that are consistent with a “rules-based order”, some minilateral groupings kill two birds with a stone because they also counterbalance China’s flexing of its muscles across the board. The AUKUS partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia is a case in point.
But domestic priorities take precedence, and there are times when pressing domestic issues and political polarization have repercussions on the trajectory of minilateral maturity in the Indo-Pacific. Last year, President Biden abruptly canceled his trip to Australia for the Quad leadership summit, along with what would have been a historic visit to Papua New Guinea, because of the ongoing debt gridlock between his administration and lawmakers on Capitol Hill. At first glance, it would be understandable to assume that Washington’s occasional flakiness in the diplomatic arena can blemish U.S. credibility in Asia for years to come, but to be clear, this last-minute change in plans has happened before. One such example took place in October 2013 when former U.S. President Obama cut his tour in Asia short and was a no-show at the APEC summit in Indonesia due to a government shutdown.
Whether we like it or not, history has a proclivity of repeating itself. This year, a few headlines relating to when this year’s Quad leadership summit, which will be held in India, have circulated around how Biden’s re-election bid is a major determining factor behind when the summit will take place. Initially, Indian Prime Minister Modi planned to roll out the red carpet for President Biden as a special guest for last month’s Republic Day festivities and then convene the Quad leadership summit the day after. Modi’s efforts were ultimately hamstrung because Biden passed up on the offer to travel to India. In this case, however, there is also a sticking point in the U.S. - India bilateral relationship because the U.S. Justice Department formally charged an Indian citizen who allegedly plotted to kill a Sikh activist on American soil in November. But two weeks ago, U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti hinted that the summit won’t occur until after the November elections. As part of his comments, Garcetti said that Biden’s re-election campaign would not derail efforts that have already been made via the Quad. Crucially, should Japanese Prime Minister Kishida visit to Washington, DC in early-April bears fruit, President Biden will have hosted the leaders from all Quad countries for an official state visit, which speaks volumes how the grouping is a core aspect of the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific strategy. But as the year continues, foreign policy observers should anticipate domestic circumstances, whether it be in the U.S. or in a different country, can curtail the steady momentum of the à la carte minilateral architecture.
With AI proliferation, a greater cacophony of voices will demand regulation, but innovation can’t be outpaced.
2023 was a year of a great awakening and transformation for AI. Thanks to ChatGPT and similar platforms that followed, AI quickly permeated public consciousness on a global scale by making front-page news all the time. There is understandably a lot of hype around them because these technologies are amplifying our culture of instant gratification. Many companies and users can now acquire the information they’re looking for in seconds at the press of a button. Artificial intelligence in its abbreviated form A.I. means love in Japanese, but not everyone can think lovely thoughts when it comes to its proliferation because some believe that it’s truly running amok. Against this backdrop, there has been a greater push to turn guiding principles into action. For instance, the European Union agreed to pass the AI Act, which is one the world’s first legal frameworks on how to regulate its use. With the EU looking to get a head start on standardizing usage of AI with oversight and accountability, various stakeholders deeply embedded in the AI R&D landscape will grapple with how to ensure that regulations don’t breathe oxygen out of innovative thinking.
In Asia, business executives are eager, yet simultaneously apprehensive, about placing their fiscal eggs into the generative AI (GenAI) basket. According to EY’s most recent quarterly survey, 71 percent of CEOs in the Asia-Pacific recognize the necessity to foster GenAI in order to preserve their competitive edge. On the other hand, the same percentage of respondents are encountering regulatory roadblocks due to the uncertainty looming over the nascent AI landscape. Companies like Vingroup, which is one of Vietnam’s biggest conglomerates, developed its own in-house GenAI language learning modeI called ViGPT in order to accommodate local populations and stakeholders who do not understand English. Since GenAI models are currently more compatible with the English language, we can expect that Asia-based firms, along with multinational businesses who are expanding their outreach across the Indo-Pacific, will follow suit towards producing their own GenAI platforms for local populations. In time, we will be able to see how quickly companies can release GenAI tools that cater to those who lack technical expertise and those with little to no English fluency, and if producing indigenous AI models will enable Asia economies to maintain a competitive edge against powerhouses, namely the U.S. and China. But one thing is certain: the digital revolution is undergoing a sea change, and the debate circling on the virtues and the potential human consequences posed by AI will constantly be put into question.
Europe will de-risk itself from China and will continue to enhance its strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific.
Europe is at a tug-of-war with itself because it is navigating the murky waters of how to respond to China’s assertiveness across the board without compromising its commercial linkages to the Chinese market. There is no black-and-white way to manage this delicate balancing act, but one thing that 2023 made abundantly clear is that European stakeholders are acting with a greater sense of urgency to confront issues relating to China’s expanding strategic footprint. For one, Germany released its inaugural China strategy last summer, and it underlined the necessity for Berlin to take a tougher line, particularly because China’s increasing assertiveness is no longer confined to Asia - it has taken on an international level. Two months ago, Italy submitted a resignation letter to the Chinese leadership, informing them that Rome will not extend its five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This move reflects Italy’s realization that the BRI is incapable of yielding the economic dividends that it was hoping to achieve. It also illustrates Rome’s preference to pull away from engaging with Chinese investments. Yet, in her first public statement after this broke news, Prime Minister Meloni maintained a conciliatory tone and expressed hopes to “improve [Italy’s] cooperation with China on trade, the economy.”
In the meantime, European countries are sequentially aligning themselves closer to Indo-Pacific partners. For one, in December, the defense ministers from Italy, Japan, and the U.K. signed a treaty in Tokyo to formalize the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) International Government Organization, which sets the stage for the three countries’ pledge to develop a 6th generation fighter jet by 2035. Meanwhile, French President Macron was the guest of honor during the festivities for India’s Republic Day in late-January. During Macron’s visit, the two countries pledged to expand defense industrial ties by co-producing helicopters and submarines for the Indian military, and they also committed to bolstering collaboration on space. These are but just a few examples that underline how Europe is attempting to sharpen its focus on the Indo-Pacific. While this speaks to a tremendous potential to strengthen Europe’s relations with numerous Indo-Pacific countries, it will be intriguing to see what quandaries arise and to what extent they may hinder progress towards actualizing these new initiatives.
In Closing: How to Look Ahead and Stay Ahead
In an era of profound change, the geopolitical dimensions in today’s Indo-Pacific region are anything but tranquil. With this state of constant uncertainty, foreign policy observers, corporate executives, and other stakeholders are wrestling with how to keep abreast of fast-paced developments while simultaneously anticipating areas of risk that can introduce more geopolitical imbalance. One question that I’ve asked myself for quite some time is how can we as foreign policy observers be more proactive, rather than reactive, in analyzing existing trends and new developments with nuance in a dynamic region that demands more focus on a global scale? This makes it all the more crucial for analysts to build situational awareness over concerning trends, as well as the promising developments animating the region today.
Although it’s been close to two months since we’ve passed the threshold of 2024, I hope that the rest of the year is filled with good health, exciting adventures and fresh opportunities for you all.